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INTRODUCTION
Hydropower development has drastically altered natural hydro-
logic conditions and aquatic habitat in the Columbia River Basin,
resulting in substantial reductions in salmonid abundance. The
Northwest Power Planning Council estimates that current annual
salmon and steelhead production in the Columbia River Basin is
10 million fish below historical levels, with 8 million of the an-
nual loss attributable to hydropower development and opera-
tion.1 Approximately half of this 8 million fish loss is attributable
to the loss of spawning and rearing habitat blocked by Grand
Coulee and Hells Canyon dams in the upper Columbia and mid-
dle Snake Rivers.2 Aside from simply blocking habitat, hydro-
power development has adversely affected fish populations in a
variety of other ways including migration delay resulting from in-
sufficient flows or habitat blockages, stranding of fish resulting
from rapid flow fluctuations, entrainment of juveniles into poorly
screened or unscreened diversions, and increased mortality re-
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and
Clark College; Endangered Species Act Section 7 Coordinator, National
Marine Fisheries Service, Northwest Region. The opinions in this arti-
cle are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Marine Fisheries Service or U.S. Department of
Commerce. The author would like to thank Michael C. Blumm, Profes-
sor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College,
and Brett Joseph, Attorney, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration, for their critical review and comments.
1. See NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, SEVENTH ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST ELECTRIC POWER AND CONSERVATION
PLANNING COUNCIL 8 (1987).
2. See SNAKE RIVER SALMON RECOVERY TEAM, NATIONAL MARINE FISH-
ERIES SERVICE, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES
SERVICE II-11 (1994).
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sulting from alterations in ambient water temperatures. 3
The full impacts of hydropower development on salmonid
populations are now evident in several proposed and final list-
ings of Pacific salmonids under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA). 4 At present, 14 evolutionarily significant units (ESUs)5 of
Pacific salmon and trout are listed by the National Marine Fish-
eries Service (NMFS) 6 as threatened or endangered species
under the ESA.7 These listings include Snake River sockeye
3. See J. Palmisano, et al., Washington Forest Protection Associa-
tion and the State of Washington Department of Natural Resources,
The Impact of Environmental and Management Factors on Washing-
ton's Wild Anadromous Salmon and Trout (1993).
4. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. (West Supp. 1998).
5. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) considers a Pa-
cific salmonid population (or group of populations) to constitute a spe-
cies under the ESA if it represents an evolutionarily significant unit (or
ESU) of the biological species. NMFS defines an ESU as a salmonid
population that 1) is substantially reproductively isolated from nonspe-
cific populations and 2) represents an important component of the ev-
olutionary legacy of the species. See 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612 (.1991) (NMFS
policy on the application of the term "species" to Pacific salmonids).
6. A 1974 Memorandum of Understanding between NMFS and
FWS establishes that NMFS retains ESA jurisdiction over fish species
that spend a majority of their lives in the marine environment, includ-
ing anadromous salmonids. See Memorandum of Understanding Be-
tween the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, United States Department of
Interior, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
United States Department of Commerce, Regarding Jurisdictional Re-
sponsibilities and Listing Procedures under the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 (1974).
7. See 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (1991) (Snake River sockeye); 57 Fed.
Reg. 14,653 (1992) (Snake River spring/summer and fall chinook); 59
Fed. Reg. 440 (1994) (Sacramento winter-run chinook); 61 Fed. Reg.
41,514 (1996) (Umpqua River cutthroat trout); 61 Fed. Reg. 56,138
(1996) (Central California coastal coho); 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588 (1997)
(Southern Oregon/Northern California coho); 62 Fed. Reg. 43,937
(1997) (Shake River, Southern California, South Central California
coastal, Central California coastal, and Upper Columbia River steel-
head); 63 Fed. Reg. 13,347 (1998) (Lower Columbia River and Central
Valley steelhead); 63 Fed. Reg. 42,587 (1998) (Oregon coastal coho); 64
Fed. Reg 14,308 (March 24, 1999) (Puget Sound, Lower Columbia
River, Upper Willamette River, and Upper Columbia River chinook);
64 Fed. Reg. 14,508 (March 25, 1999) (Hood Canal Summer-run and
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salmon (Oncorhynchus nerka), Snake River spring/summer and
fall chinook salmon (0. tshawytscha), and Snake River steelhead
(0. mykiss).8 In each of these listings, NMFS identified impacts as-
sociated with hydropower development as factors of decline for
these species. 9
The recent ESA listings discussed above provide powerful legal
.protections for these species, such as those contained in section
7 of the ESA. Section 7 requires federal agencies to insure any
action they authorize, fund, or carry out is not likely to jeopard-
ize a listed species or adversely modify its critical habitat. 10 Fed-
eral agencies comply with the requirements of section 7 through
a consultation process with the NMFS or the U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service (FWS). The courts have interpreted section 7's con-
Columbia River chum); 64 Fed. Reg 14,517 (March 25, 1999) (Upper
Willemette River and Middle Columbia River steelhead); 64 Fed. Reg.
14,528 (March 25, 1999) (Ozette Lake sockeye).
8. See 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619 (1991) (Snake River sockeye listed as
endangered); 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (1992) (Snake River spring/summer
and fall chinook listed as threatened); 62 Fed. Reg. 43,937 (1997)
(Snake River steelhead listed as threatened). The NMFS designated
critical habitat for Snake River sockeye and chinook salmon as well in
1993. See 58 Fed. Reg. 68,543 (1993).
9. See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 43,937, 43,942 (1997); G. Bryant and J.
Lynch, National Marine Fisheries Service, Factors for Decline: A Sup-
plement to the Notice of Determination for West Coast Steelhead
(1996).
10. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
11. See 50 C.ER. § 402.14 (1998) (joint NMFS/FWS regulations for
conducting formal section 7 consultations). If a federal agency deter-
mines its action may affect a listed species, it must prepare a biological
assessment (BA), analyzing the effects of the action on the species. If
the agency determines, with the written concurrence of NMFS, the ac-
tion is not likely to adversely affect the listed species, it need not initi-
ate formal consultation. However, if the action may adversely affect the
listed species, the agency must initiate formal consultation with NMFS
and submit its BA to NMFS for its consideration. The NMFS then con-
siders this BA and issues a biological opinion which may conclude (1)
the action will not likely jeopardize the species; (2) the action jeopar-
dizes the species, but reasonable and prudent alternatives exist which if
implemented, will result in the action avoiding jeopardy; or (3) the ac-
tion jeopardizes the listed species and no reasonable and prudent alter-
natives exist to avoid jeopardy.
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sultation requirements broadly, recognizing that the procedural
safeguards contained in section 7 help ensure that federal agen-
cies achieve the goals of the ESA. 12 These interpretations are
likewise consistent with the legislative history of the ESA, which
indicates that Congress intended federal agencies to cooperate in
the implementation of the goals of the Act.13
In the face of seemingly clear congressional intent and judicial
interpretation of the ESA, the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC), the federal entity responsible for licensing and
regulating private hydropower projects in the United States, 14 has
resisted ESA consultation even where it possesses clear authority
to modify project operations to conserve fish and wildlife. 5 A no-
table example is the Hells Canyon Hydropower Project, a series
of dams and facilities located on the Snake River in Idaho. His-
torically, the Snake River was the most important drainage in the
Columbia River system for producing anadromous fish, 16 but the
construction of the Hells Canyon Project substantially reduced
this river's production of chinook salmon, blocking over 80 per-
cent of its historic spawning and rearing habitat. 7 Attempts to
trap and transport fish above and below the project proved un-
successful, 8 and upon completion of the last dam in 1967, mid-
dle Snake River salmon runs were extinguished. 19 Despite the
well-documented adverse effects of this project on listed chinook
salmon and steelhead, and despite the fact that FERC has re-
tained discretion in the project's license to modify operations to
12. See Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1458 (9th Cir. 1986).
13. See S. Rep. No. 93-307, at 3 (1973) (stating "[a]ll agencies, de-
partments, and other instrumentalities of the Federal government are
directed to cooperate in the implementation of the goals of this Act").
14. FERC is an independent agency within the Department of En-
ergy which has jurisdiction over non-federal hydropower development
under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 791(a)-828(c) (1988).
15. See infra Section I.
16. See NMFS, PROPOSED RECOVERY PLAN FOR SNAKE RIVER SALMON
11-9 (1995).
17. See Scott Sonner, Critics: FERC Failing to Protect Salmon, COLUM-
BIAN, Dec. 3, 1997, at B1.
18. See infra Section I.A.
19. See Michael C. Blumm, Saving Idaho's Salmon: A History of Fail-
ure and a Dubious Future, 28 IDAHO L. REv. 667, 675 (1992).
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conserve these species, 20 FERC has failed to initiate formal con-
sultation with NMFS as required by the ESA, even after specifi-
cally requested by NMFS to do so.2 '
This paper examines FERC's obligations under the ESA in
light of the discretion it retains in the project's license. Part I be-
gins by examining the regulatory history of the Hells Canyon
Project and NMFS' attempts at initiating formal consultation with
FERC. Part II examines federal agencies' duties under section 7,
as indicated by the Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill2  and explained by the Ninth Circuit in Pacific Rivers Council
v. Thomas,2 3 and also discusses the implications of a formal re-
quest for consultation by the Secretary of Commerce. Part III dis-
cusses the importance of reserved agency discretion in determin-
ing the need for consultation and analyzes prior court decisions
establishing the limitations of federal duties under section 7. Part
IV analyzes a 1980 settlement agreement between Idaho Power
Company (IPC)2 4 and state and federal resource agencies, which
IPC claims obviates the need for FERC's consultation with NMFS,
but which in fact does not eliminate FERC's independent duty to
implement the ESA. Part V discusses the relationship between
sections 7 and 9 of the ESA and considers the importance of sec-
tion 9 liability absent consultation under section 7. Part VI dis-
cusses the potential implications of requiring FERC to consult on
the ongoing operations of projects which it licenses, and pro-
vides an approach to solving the biological, legal, and practical
challenges facing all agencies involved. The paper concludes
that, despite the 1980 agreement, FERC is required to initiate
formal consultation with NMFS under section 7 of the ESA for
the ongoing operations of the Hells Canyon Project, because it
retains discretion to modify project operations. Moreover, a com-
prehensive approach to consultation is needed at this point for
all hydropower projects under FERC's jurisdiction to avoid spe-
cies extinction.
20. See infra Section I.C.
21. See infra Section II.B.
22. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
23. 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082
(1995).
24. IPC is the FERC-licensed operator of the Hells Canyon Project.
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I. THE REGULATORY HISTORY OF THE HELLS CANYON PROJECT
A. Pre-ESA Regulation: Resource Agencies Seek Compromise
On August 4, 1955, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) 25 is-
sued a fifty-year license to IPC, authorizing construction and op-
eration of the Hells Canyon Project.26 The project consists of
three dams that were constructed in succession down the river.
IPC first completed construction of Brownlee Dam in 1958; then
it completed construction of the second dam, Oxbow, in 1962.
IPC completed construction of the third and final project, Hells
Canyon Dam, in 1967. The entire project, consisting of these
three dams, produces about 1.16 megawatts of electric power per
year, accounting for about 70 percent of IPC's total annual hy-
droelectric energy output.21
At the time of the initial licensing, FERC recognized that addi-
tional fish passage measures may be required at some point in
the future. This intent is reflected in Article 35 of the license,
which provides for fish protection as follows:
The Licensee shall construct, maintain, and operate or shall ar-
range for the construction, maintenance and operation of such
fish ladders, fish traps or other fish handling facilities or fish
protective devices and provide fish hatchery facilities for the
purpose of conserving the fishery resources and comply with
such reasonable modifications of the project structures and op-
eration in the interest of fish life as may be prescribed hereaf-
ter by the Commission upon its own motion or upon the rec-
ommendations of the Secretary of Interior and the
conservation agencies of the States of Idaho and Oregon.28
The open-ended nature of this license article enabled state and
federal resource agencies to successfully petition FERC on several
occasions to require a variety of mitigation measures to conserve
salmonids.
25. The FPC was subsequently succeeded by FERC in 1978 with
the passage of the Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No.
95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7352
(1988) and scattered sections of Title 3, 5, 7, 12 & 15).
26. See 14 F.P.C. 55 (1955).
27. See FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, HYDROELECTRIC
PROJECTS PRESENTLY UNDER COMMISSION LICENSE (1998).
28. 14 F.P.C. 55, 80 (1955).
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During the period of the late 1950s through the mid-1970s,
FPC issued several orders prescribing and modifying the require-
ments for fish passage facilities at the project.2 9 One measure
that proved unsuccessful was a trap and haul program designed
to pass fish around the project dams.30 After this failure to reest-
ablish passage, IPC and the fishery agencies agreed to a hatchery
compensation program. 31 However, this compensation program
proved inadequate due to low numbers of returning fish. In 1976
NMFS and state agencies petitioned the FPC for a hearing and a
determination of IPC's obligations under Article 35 of its 1955 li-
cense. 32 An administrative law judge conducted hearings in 1978
after which the parties entered into settlement negotiations.
On February 27, 1980 FERC approved a settlement agreement
between the states of Idaho, Oregon, Washington, and NMFS
and IPC which required IPC to "provide, operate, and maintain
fish traps, fish hatchery facilities, and fish handling and transpor-
tation facilities that will provide annual production levels of fall
chinook, spring chinook, and steelhead smolts. ' ' 33 In this settle-
ment agreement, the state agencies, without NMFS' concur-
rence,34 stipulated that IPC's commitments constituted "full satis-
29. See, e.g., 19 F.P.C. 237 (1958); 29 F.P.C. 478 (1963); 30 EP.C.
1471 (1963); 33 F.P.C. 51 (1965); 35 F.P.C. 162 (1966); 37 F.P.C. 290
(1967); 49 F.P.C. 707 (1973).
30. The passage program consisted of trapping adult salmonids at
Oxbow Dam and transporting them for release in the Brownlee pool.
Juveniles were to be captured at Brownlee Dam and released down-
stream from the project. In 1965, the FPC approved a stipulation be-
tween IPC and the fishery agencies authorizing the abandonment of
this trap and haul program. This program was abandoned because few
juveniles were captured at the Dam due to poor migration conditions
in the Brownlee reservoir. See 33 F.P.C. 51 (1965).
31. See Blumm, supra note 19, at 675.
32. See 56 EP.C. 946, 948 (1976).
33. 10 FE.R.C. 61,190 (1980) (order approving uncontested of-
fer of settlement).
34. NMFS failed to stipulate to section II of the settlement agree-
ment which provides that IPC's commitments in the agreement consti-
tute full satisfaction of its duties under Article 35 of its license. While
the agreement does not state why NMFS did not stipulate to this sec-
tion, the logical answer is that NMFS disagreed with this provision and
intended to resolve this issue in future proceedings. However, given
that NMFS stipulated to other sections of this agreement, the signifi-
cance of its failure to stipulate to section II is unclear.
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faction" of its responsibilities to mitigate for numerical losses of
salmon and steelhead at the project.35 However, all agencies, in-
cluding NMFS, stipulated to the following provision:
The Petitioners agree that they will not for the duration of the
current Project No. 1971 (Hells Canyon Project) license seek
relief from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on any
matter concerning Licensee's responsibility to compensate for
salmon and steelhead losses under the Fish and Wildlife Coor-
dination Act or the Federal Power Act nor seek changes in the
operation of Project No. 1971 . ..36
This provision is followed by two exceptions. One exception is
that IPC may provide additional flows at the request of the fish-
ery agencies for the out-migration of fall chinook hatchery
smolts released by IPC at Hells Canyon Dam.37 The second ex-
ception provides for setting conditions for the release of water
purchased by the fishery agencies.38
B. Post-ESA Regulation: NMFS Asserts its Authority over Project
Operations
During the past eighteen years, several events occurred which
call into question the biological and legal adequacy of this settle-
ment agreement. In 1990, the Shonshone-Bannock Tribes and
environmental groups petitioned NMFS to list Snake River sock-
eye and chinook salmon as threatened or endangered species
under the ESA.39 Both of these species were later, in fact, listed
as endangered and threatened under the ESA.40 A third species,
Snake River steelhead, was recently listed as a threatened species
35. Settlement Agreement between Idaho Power Company and the
Idaho Department of Fish and Game, the Oregon Department of Fish
and Wildlife, the Washington Departments of Fisheries and Game, and
the National Marine Fisheries Service at § 11 (1980).
36. Id. at § III. While the states and N1IFS stipulated to this sec-
tion of the settlement agreement, no Indian Tribes were a party to this
agreement. Consequently, this agreement should not foreclose tribal
claims for lost or diminished tribal resources.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See 55 Fed. Reg. 22,942 (1990); 55 Fed. Reg. 37,342 (1990) (list-
ing notices of receipt and acceptance of petitions to list Snake River
sockeye and chinook salmon).
40. See supra note 8.
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under the ESA.41 These listings indicate that the provisions of the
1980 settlement agreement have failed to mitigate the impacts of
the project and also show that the agreement's commitment to
hatchery production likely contributed to the continued decline
of these species. 42
The precarious status of these species recently led NMFS to re-
quest that FERC initiate formal consultation concerning the
ongoing effects of project operations on listed salmonids. In let-
ters to FERC dated May 19, 1997, and October 17, 1997, NMFS
requested that FERC conduct formal consultation under section
7(a) (2) of the ESA regarding operations at the Hells Canyon
Project.43 In these letters, NMFS claimed project operations were
likely to adversely affect listed salmon and their critical habitat,
and that FERC, with discretion to adjust project operations,
should consult with NMFS as required by section 7.44 In its Octo-
ber 17, 1997 letter, NMFS stated that informal discussions be-
tween NMFS and IPC regarding the Hells Canyon Project had to
date focused on partial mitigation strategies and had not ad-
dressed the full range of project effects. 45 Absent a broader eval-
uation of project impacts on listed salmonids, NMFS concluded
that project operations were likely to adversely affect listed Snake
River species, requiring formal consultation under section
7(a) (2).46 NMFS further recommended that FERC prepare a bio-
logical assessment (BA) to evaluate the current likely impacts of
operation of the Hells Canyon Project on listed salmon and their
41. See supra note 8.
42. In its final listing of Snake River steelhead as threatened,
NMFS stated that the impacts associated with hatchery production have
contributed to the decline of this species. See 62 Fed. Reg. 43,937,
43,944 (1997). Therefore, the very program that was intended to miti-
gate for the impacts of project construction likely exacerbated existing
conditions. See also Blumm, supra note 19, at 679-680.
43. Letter from William W. Stelle, Jr., Regional Administrator,
NMFS, to Elizabeth Anne Moler, Chairman, FERC (May 19, 1997); Let-
ter from William W. Stelle, Jr., Regional Administrator, NMFS, to James
J. Hoecker, Chair, FERC (October 17, 1997).
44. Id.
45. Letter from William W. Stelle, Jr., Regional Administrator,
NMFS, to James J. Hoecker, Chair, FERC at 2 (October 17, 1997).
46. See id.
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critical habitat.47
On December 3, 1997 FERC responded to NMFS' October 17,
1997 letter regarding consultation on the Hells Canyon Project.48
FERC acknowledged the need to discuss the impacts of the pro-
ject on listed species and requested a meeting with NMFS and
IPC representatives to initiate these discussions. 49 In a letter
dated February 6, 1998 FERC stated that it had designated IPC as-
its non-federal representative for conducting consultation with
NMFS for the interim operation of the Hells Canyon Project, °
and that it had directed IPC to prepare a draft BA evaluating the
potential effects of the project operations on the listed Snake
River species and their critical habitat."1 On October 29, 1998
IPC filed a draft BA with FERC that was subsequently provided
to NMFS.12 By letters dated November 17 and November 20,
1998, NMFS presented its comments on the draft BA to FERC
and requested that IPC collect more detailed information regard-
47. See id.
48. Letter from James J. Hoecker, Chairman, FERC, to William
Stelle, Jr., Regional Administrator, NMFS (December 3, 1997).
49. See id.
50. NMFS' implementing regulations for the ESA provide that fed-
eral agencies may designate a non-federal representative to conduct in-
formal consultation or prepare a BA by giving written notice to NMFS
of such designation, and providing guidance and supervision in the
preparation of the BA. The ultimate responsibility for compliance with
section 7 remains, however, with the federal action agency. See 50 C.F.R
§ 402.08 (1998).
51. Letter from Kevin Madden, Acting Director, Office of Hydro-
power Licensing, FERC, to William Stelle, Jr., Regional Administrator,
NMFS (February 6, 1998). In this letter FERC summarized discussions
occurring at a meeting held between FERC, NMFS, and IPC on Janu-
ary 22, 1998, regarding the project.
52. Letter from Nathan F. Gardiner, IPC, to David P. Boergers,
Secretary, FERC (October 29, 1998). The draft BA states that IPC de-
veloped it to provide a technical basis for consultation, under section
7(a) (2) of the ESA, between FERC and NMFS and the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, for the relicensing and continued operation of the
Hells Canyon Project. Idaho Power Company, Draft Biological Assess-
ment of Hells Canyon Complex Operations for the Protection of ESA-
Listed Fish Species at 1 (October 26, 1998). This statement indicates
IPC's belief that FERC has an obligation under section 7(a) (2) to con-
sult with NMFS regarding ongoing project operations.
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ing operations at the Hells Canyon Project to satisfy the informa-
tion requirements of section 7.53 On November 24, 1998 IPC re-
sponded that collection of the additional data would require
additional time and that such a delay would likely affect FERC's
ability to submit a final BA to NMFS by the target date of De-
cember 1, 1998.14 On February 19, 1999, FERC provided NMFS
with a final biological assessment that had been completed by
IPC, and adopted by FERC with minor changes.5 On March 24,
1999, NMFS acknowledged receipt of the BA and stated it ex-
pected to complete a biological opinion by August 4, 1999.56 As
of August 10, 1999, NMFS had not completed this biological
opinion nor had it indicated when it intends to do so.
C. Continuing Project Operations and the Threat of Litigation
On March 24, 1998 environmental groups filed a petition5 7 for
review in the Ninth Circuit, claiming that FERC violated the ESA
because it had not initiated formal consultation regarding the
53. Letter from Brian J. Brown, Director, Hydro Program, NMFS,
to John Blair, Snake River Relicensing Environmental Coordinator,
FERC (November 17, 1998); Letter from Brian J. Brown, Director,
Hydro Program, NMFS, to David Boergers, Secretary, FERC (November
20, 1998).
54. Letter from James C. Tucker, Counsel for IPC, to David
Boergers, Secretary, FERC (November 24, 1998).
55. Letter from J. Mark Robinson, Director, Division of Licensing
and Compliance, FERC, to William Stelle, Jr., Regional Administrator,
NMFS (February 19, 1999). FERC concludes in this letter and the asso-
ciated BA that operation of the Hells Canyon Complex is not likely to
adversely affect Snake River salmon and steelhead or their critical
habitat.
56. Letter from William Stelle, Jr., Regional Administrator, NMFS,
to J. Mark Robinson, Director, Division of Licensing and Compliance,
FERC (March 24, 1999). NMFS states in this letter that it does not con-
cur with FERC's determination that project operations are not likely to
adversely affect listed species or their critical habitat and therefore will
prepare a biological opinion analyzing the proposed action.
57. Petitioners include American Rivers, Northwest Environmental
Defense Center, Oregon Natural Resources Council, Pacific Coast Fed-
eration of Fishermen's Association, Trout Unlimited, Institute for Fish-
eries Resources, Federation of Fly Fishers, and the Sierra Club.
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ongoing operations of the Hells Canyon Project.5 8 FERC filed a
motion for summary judgment on May 11, 1998, stating the peti-
tion for review was moot because they had fully complied with
NMFS' request to initiate consultation under the ESA.59 On
March 16, 1999, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. 60
In its brief concerning this case, FERC did not state whether it
intends its ongoing dialogue with NMFS regarding project opera-
tions to constitute formal consultation under section 7(a)(2) of
the ESA. Instead, FERC apparently intends its present consulta-
58. Motion of Respondent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
to Dismiss Petition for Review at 11, American Rivers v. FERC, 170 F3d
896 (9th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-70347). FERC also raised jurisdictional ar-
guments in its motion; specifically, whether the petitioners had prop-
erly invoked the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit in this case.
59. American Rivers et al. v. FERC, 170 F.3d 896. In a one page opin-
ion, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to obtain jurisdic-
tion over FERC by petitioning FERC to consult with NMFS, and then
deeming FERC's inaction on its petition to constitute a final, appeala-
ble order. Section 313 of the FPA provides that jurisdiction to "affirm,
modify, or set aside in whole or in part: the orders of the Commission
lies exclusively with the United States Court of Appeals." 16 U.S.C. §
8251(b) (1998). To seek relief in the courts of appeal, a party must be
aggrieved by the Commission in a proceeding under the FPA. See id.
An aggrieved party must, within 30 days of the issuance of a Commis-
sion order, apply to the Commission for rehearing or reconsideration
raising all issues then brought on appeal. See 16 U.S.C. 8251(a) & (b)
(1998). However, no statutory deadline exists in the FPA to require
FERC to act on a petition or issue an order. FERC uses this procedural
loophole in the FPA to avoid judicial review of its failure to consult
under the ESA. See id.; see also Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v.
FERC, 967 F. Supp. 1166, 1172-1175 (D. Ariz. 1997) (holding that a suit
challenging FERC's failure to formally consult under section 7 at the
district court level could not be brought under the ESA but instead
must be brought in the court of appeals after complying with the juris-
dictional requirements of the FPA). Consequently, plaintiffs seeking to
compel FERC's action on petitions may be relegated to provisions of
the Administrative Procedures Act which enables courts to compel
agency action that is unreasonably delayed. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1999);
see also U.S. v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134, 137 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing the
legislative history of the APA).
60. See American Rivers et al. v. FERC, 170 F.3d 896.
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tion to satisfy its obligations under section 7 (a) (1),61 the require-
ment for federal agencies to review programs administered by
them and use their authorities to further the purposes of the
ESA.62 NMFS contends that FERC retains discretion to modify
ongoing project operations and that those operations are likely
to adversely affect listed species; 63 as a result, the agency has a
duty to conduct formal consultation under section 7(a) (2). 64 The
federal government's inability to resolve this internal conflict in-
dicates the significance of the issue at hand: how expansively
61. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. While FERC does
not interpret its ongoing discussions with NMFS as section 7 (a) (2) con-
sultation, IPC does construe these discussions to constitute ESA consul-
tation between federal agencies.
62. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (1988). The distinction between an
agency's duties under sections 7 (a) (1) and 7 (a) (2) is an important one.
Section 7(a) (1) requires agencies to use their authorities to further the
purposes of the ESA; however, the manner in which agencies accom-
plish this is discretionary, and the provision contains no procedural or
substantive requirements. Section 7(a) (2) requires agencies to avoid
jeopardy through consultation with NMFS - a substantive requirement
that is mandatory. Furthermore, section 7(a) (2) contains procedural
safeguards that help insure agencies consider the impacts of their ac-
tions on listed species as well as the recommendations of NMFS to
avoid jeopardy to such species. The procedural aspects of section
7(a) (2) insure that the substantive provisions of the ESA are realized.
The findings of NMFS under section 7(a) (2) are entitled to deference
by a reviewing court, giving them substantial weight. See Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1414 (9th
Cir. 1990). Consequently, while section 7(a)(1) encourages federal
agencies to review their programs for consistency with the purposes of
the ESA, section 7(a) (2) contains procedural and substantive safe-
guards that insure agencies adequately analyze their actions and give
appropriate weight to conservation recommendations made by NMFS
in reviewing such actions. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit recently held
that section 7(a) (1) imposes an affirmative obligation on each federal
agency to conserve listed species. See Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d
606, 616 (5th Cir. 1998). To achieve this objective, the agencies must
consult with the Secretary, not just undertake generalized consultation.
See id.
63. See infra Section II.A.
64. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (1998) (defining the NMFS regulation
requirements for formal consultation).
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should the courts interpret the procedural requirements of the
ESA in light of its substantive goals?
II. FEDERAL ACTIONS AND AGENCY DUTIES UNDER SECTION 7
A. Defining What Constitutes an Agency Action Under Section 7
NMFS' ESA implementing regulations define a federal action
broadly as "all activities or programs of any kind authorized,
funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies
in the United States upon the high seas. '65 The courts have like-
wise supported a broad interpretation of federal actions requir-
ing consultation, including both proposed and ongoing actions.66
For example, in Tennessee Valley Authority, the now famous ESA
case concerning, the Tellico dam, the Court held that even
though construction of the dam began prior to passage of the
ESA, dam operation could not continue because it would jeop-
ardize, and likely extirpate, the listed species. 67 The Court went
on to state that "it is clear Congress foresaw that section 7 would,
on occasion, require agencies to alter ongoing projects in order
to fulfill the goals of the Act. ' 6 This statement by the Court indi-
cates that after a species is listed, federal agencies have an ongo-
ing duty to review the effects of previously authorized project op-
erations, and to modify those operations if they might have an
adverse affect on a listed species. 69
65. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1998).
66. See Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 611 (9th Cir.
1984) (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 n.18 (1978)).
In this footnote, the Court stated the term "actions" contained in sec-
tion 7 includes "all actions that an agency can ever take," including
those taking place beyond the mere planning stage. Also, the Court
held a more narrow reading of the term "actions" would be inconsis-
tent with congressional intent.
67. 437 U.S. at 173-174.
68. Id. at 186.
69. Aside from an ongoing duty to review the effects of previously
authorized actions, federal agencies and applicants must avoid making
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources with respect to
an agency action which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or
implementation of reasonable and prudent measures. See 16 U.S.C §
1536(d) (1988). This duty only exists, however, after the initiation of
formal consultation under section 7(a)(2). Id.
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Building upon Tennessee Valley Authority, the Ninth Circuit re-
cently held that comprehensive federal land management plans
that guide a multitude of individual projects constitute "ongoing
agency actions" requiring consultation.70 In Pacific Rivers Council,
at issue was whether the U.S. Forest Service's (USFS) failure to
consult over its land and resource management plans (LRMPs)
violated its ESA obligations. 71 The LRMPs established forest-wide
and area-specific standards and guidelines detailing every re-
source plan, permit, contract, or any other document pertaining
to the forest.72 The USFS argued in this case that the LRMPs did
not constitute ongoing agency actions, and therefore were sub-
ject to consultation requirements only when initially adopted, re-
vised, or amended.73 However, the Ninth Circuit held that the
LRMPs do represent an ongoing agency action since they are
comprehensive plans which govern individual forest projects, and
therefore have an ongoing and lasting effect even after
adoption.74
The situation in the Pacific Rivers Council case and the case of
the Hells Canyon Project are similar in a variety of ways. First,
the FERC license in this case guides all aspects of the project, in-
cluding construction, maintenance, and operation.75 This perva-
sive control by the license is even more direct and influential
than the forest plans in Pacific Rivers Council. Second, the project
must operate in compliance with its license or risk sanctions
from FERC, 76 a fact underscoring the importance of license con-
ditions on project operations. Finally, the license at issue retains
ongoing, lasting effects after adoption, similar to the LRMPs, be-
cause the license directs project operations for a period of up to
50 years.77 These similarities indicate that, under the Pacific Rivers
Council standard, FERC licenses constitute a federal action under
70. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
71. Id.
72. See id. at 1052.
73. See id. at 1053.
74. See id.
75. See generally 14 F.P.C. 55 (1955).
76. See 16 U.S.C. § 799 (1998) (listing conditions of FERC
licenses).
77. See 16 U.S.C. § 799(4) (1998) (stating the duration of licenses).
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section 7 because they guide the implementation of every indi-
vidual aspect of the project and have an ongoing and lasting ef-
fect on project operations. 78
B. Interpretation of the "May Affect" Trigger Contained in Section 7
Under NMFS' ESA implementing regulations, federal agencies
must review their actions at the earliest possible time to deter-
mine if they "may affect" listed species or their critical habitat.7 9
If such a determination is made, formal consultation is required
unless the agency undertakes an informal consultation or prepa-
ration of a biological assessment which, along with written con-
currence of NMFS, indicates that the action is not likely to ad-
versely affect the listed species or its critical habitat.80 NMFS may
request consultation when it believes agency actions may affect
listed species, but such a consultation cannot be compelled."'
Consequently, an agency's own determination of whether their
action "may affect" is an important threshold step in assessing
the need for formal consultation.
78. In many ways, FERC licenses are more directly related to ongo-
ing actions affecting the environment than those guided by LRMPs.
For example, while LRMPs contain standards that guide both present
and future actions, a FERC license contains explicit criteria that con-
trol project construction and operation (e.g., project schematics, mini-
mum flow levels, generation capacity). In this sense, the link between a
FERC *license and the ultimate action is less remote than an LRMP,
which only contains standards for activities as opposed to explicit crite-
ria for operation.
79. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (1998).
80. See id. See also 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,949 (1986). As the pre-
amble to the section 7 regulations states, the threshold for formal con-
sultation must be set sufficiently low to allow federal agencies to satisfy
their duty to "insure" under section 7(a) (2). Therefore, the burden is
on the federal action agency to show the absence of likely, adverse ef-
fects to listed species or critical habitat as a result of the proposed ac-
tion to be excepted from its formal consultation obligation. Any possi-
ble effect, whether beneficial, benign, adverse, or of an undetermined
character, triggers the formal consultation requirement.
81. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2140-42
(1992).
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In the case of the Hells Canyon project, FERC has indicated
that ongoing project operations may affect listed chinook salmon
and steelhead.8 2 Under NMFS' implementing regulations, FERC
bears the duty to prove adverse effects to listed species or their
critical habitat would be unlikely.8 3 Therefore, given the sensitiv-
ity of the section 7 trigger,8 4 FERC must initiate formal consulta-
tion or articulate rational reasons why such consultation is not
required.
C. The Duty to Consult when Requested to do so by the Secretary
The ESA does not give NMFS the power to order other agen-
cies to comply with its requests or to veto their decisions. 5 In-
stead, section 7 imposes a duty of consultation on all federal
agencies. 86 In most cases federal agencies initiate consultation
with NMFS when they determine their activity may affect listed
species. However, provisions exist in NMFS' regulations for it to
request formal consultation when deemed necessary.87 The Ninth
Circuit has held that the Secretary's request for consultation is
an interpretation of its own regulations entitling it to substantial
deference. 88
On two separate occasions, NMFS made written requests for a
formal consultation with FERC regarding the ongoing operations
of the Hells Canyon Project.89 In so doing, NMFS reasonably in-
terpreted its own regulations and determined that hydroelectric
project operations constitute a discretionary FERC action that
82. See supra Section I.B. (Correspondence between FERC, IPC,
and NMFS).
83. See supra note 79.
84. See supra note 79.
85. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th Cir.
1976).
86. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2)-(a)(3) (1998).
87. See 50 C.F.R § 402.14(a) (1998) (formal consultation require-
menu). NMFS' ESA implementing regulations provide that in request-
ing consultation, "the Director shall forward to the Federal agency a
written explanation of the basis for the request." Id.
88. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1987).
89. See supra note 43-47 and accompanying text.
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may affect listed species or their critical habitat. 90 Because
NMFS' consultation request is an interpretation of its own regu-
lations, it should be accorded deference by a reviewing court.91
Such deference is particularly appropriate in evaluating the pro-
cedure NMFS uses to enforce the ESA.92
III. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE NEED FOR
CONSULTATION
A. The Importance of Agency Involvement and Retained Discretion
Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Tennessee Valley Author-
ity v. Hill, the Ninth Circuit in Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas
held that Congress intended to enact a broad definition of the
phrase "agency actions" contained in section 7(a) (2) of the
ESA.93 Consistent with this holding, NMFS' ESA implementing
regulation states that "Section 7 and the requirements of this
Part apply to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal
involvement or control. ' 94 The Ninth Circuit has given substan-
tial deference to these regulations.95 Therefore, in determining if
section 7 consultation is required, one must evaluate the amount
of discretion or involvement retained by the federal agency in
90. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (1998) (requirements for formal con-
sultation); 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (1998) (applicability of section 7 to fed-
eral actions); 50 C.ER. § 402.02 (1998) (defining the term "action").
91. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d at 1388. See also Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Comms. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703
(1995), citing, inter alia, Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 373 (1986) (stating "[t]he latitude the
ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute, together with the de-
gree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, establishes
that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's reasonable
interpretation").
92. See The Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 546
(D. Va. 1998) (citing Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense, 467
U.S. 837 (1984)) (establishing the guidelines for courts to follow when
reviewing an agency's construction of a statute).
93. 30 F3d at 1054.
94. 50 C.FR. § 402.03 (1998).
95. See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir.
1996); Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing
50 C.F.R. §§ 402.03 & 402.16).
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the authorized action. In the context of the Hells Canyon Pro-
ject, and FERC licenses in general, courts will likely examine the
amount of discretion retained by FERC in the project license, or
FERC discretion reserved by other areas of the FPA, to deter-
mine its need for ESA consultation regarding ongoing project
operations.
The courts have considered the question of agency discretion
and the need for ESA consultation on several occasions. In Sierra
Club v. Babbitt, the Ninth Circuit held that where a federal
agency lacks the discretion to influence private action, as in con-
tractual obligations, consultation is not required.96 In this case,
the U.S. Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") granted a right-
of-way to a private logging company that permitted construction
of a logging road across federal land prior to passage of the
ESA.97 The Sierra Club challenged BLM's approval of the right-
of-way, claiming that BLM had violated section 7 for failing to
consult with FWS regarding potential impacts to listed spotted
owls. 9 However, the Ninth Circuit held that since the right-of-
way was granted prior to passage of the ESA, and BLM presently
lacked discretion to influence the private action, consultation
would be a meaningless exercise. 99
More recently, in NRDC v. Houston, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the need for agency discretion before making consultation
mandatory.100 In this case, environmental groups challenged
BLM's failure to consult regarding its renewal of irrigation con-
96. 65 F.3d at 1509 n.10; see also Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998).
97. See id. at 1509-10. (As a result of constructing the logging road
across federal lands, the private logging company gained access to
timberlands containing listed spotted owl habitat. Therefore, environ-
mental groups feared that logging operations carried out in these areas
may have harmed the listed species by destroying its habitat).
98. See id.
99. See id. The right-of-way agreement, signed prior to passage of
the ESA, permitted BLM to object to certain private activities in three
limited instances; however, the court found that this limited control
did not provide sufficient agency discretion to require consultation be-
cause none of the instances were related to the protection of protected
species. See id. at n.10.
100. 146 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1998).
289
290 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. X
tracts at Friant Dam, located in California. 10' In holding for the
environmental groups in this case, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that because the reclamation laws require BLM to renew such
contracts on "mutually agreeable" terms, it possessed discretion
to negotiate the terms of renewed irrigation contracts. 02 This dis-
cretion triggered consultation requirements prior to the renewal
of the water supply contracts.103
B. Consultation Requirements During the FERC Relicensing Process
Courts have recognized the importance that FERC retain dis-
cretion regarding its licenses before requiring a section 7 consul-
tation. °4 For example, in Platte River I, at issue was FERC's failure
to incorporate license articles into annual licenses'0 5 to protect a
number of listed migratory bird species. FERC ultimately incor-
porated protective license articles into the license for one pro-
ject, but declined to do so for another, because it determined it
did not have the authority to do so because the license lacked an
express reservation of authority to modify project operations for
conservation purposes. 0 6 The plaintiffs claimed that FERC did,
in fact, possess authority to modify the license, arguing that (1)
the license contained a reopener clause, or (2) the ESA ex-
panded FERC's authority to modify the license. 07 In response to
the first argument, the court deferred to FERC's interpretation
of hydroelectric licenses, holding that FERC's interpretation of
101. See id. at 1125.
102. Id. at 1126.
103. See id. at 1127.
104. See, e.g., Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Mainte-
nance Trust v. FERC, 962 E2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Platte River II);
Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. FERC, 967 E Supp 1166 (D.
Ariz. 1997) (dismissed on jurisdictional grounds).
105. FERC interprets the FPA as requiring the issuance of an an-
nual license, and that issuance of an annual license is a nondiscretion-
ary act. See Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indi-
ans v. FPC, 510 F.2d 198, 203-210 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
106. See Platte River II at 32. FERC interprets the FPA as preclud-
ing it from amending annual licenses, absent an express reservation of
authority, or "reopener clause" in the original license.
107. See id. at 33.
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the license was reasonable.108 Regarding the second argument,
the court held the ESA does not expand the powers conferred
on an agency by its enabling act. 0 9 Therefore, absent an express
reservation of authority under the FPA in a particular license to
modify the license in the future, FERC would not possess, nor
would the ESA provide, the discretion necessary to require sec-
tion 7 consultation.110 While the holdings in Platte River have
108. See id.
109. See id. at 34. This holding of the D.C. Circuit seems in con-
flict with the express provisions of section 7(a) (1) of the ESA. Section
7(a) (1) requires federal agencies to use their authorities in furtherance
of the purposes of the Act by carrying out programs for the conserva-
tion of listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1988). Some commentators
argue that this broad mandate to conserve species expands federal
agencies' duties beyond that contained in their enabling statutes. See
J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a) (1) of the "New" Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering
and Redefining the Untapped Power of the Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve
Species, 25 ENVTL. 1107 (1995). A recent Fifth Circuit case interpreting
the requirements of section 7(a) (1) supports this broader reading. In
Sierra Club v. Glickman, the Sierra Club challenged the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture's (USDA) failure to consult with FWS over USDA
programs associated with management of the Edwards Aquifer, located
in Texas. Heavy pumping of the aquifer for irrigation purposes has
lead to the decline of numerous listed species. In analyzing the USDA's
duties under the ESA, the Fifth Circuit held that section 7(a)(1) "im-
poses a duty on all federal agencies to consult and develop programs
for the conservation of each endangered and threatened species." Si-
erra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 616 (5th Cir. 1998). The holding
in Sierra Club v. Glickman indicates that section 7(a) (1) in fact ex-
pands agencies' duties under the ESA requiring them to affirmatively
conserve listed species, an interpretation that is in conflict with the
Platte River cases, but seemingly more consistent with the Supreme
Court's broad reading of the ESA in Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill. See
supra Section II.A.
110. See Platte River II at n.2. In this footnote the D.C. Circuit es-
sentially stated that it could see no practical value in requiring FERC to
formally consult when informal consultations had already taken place.
This view of section 7 fails to recognize the important procedural pro-
tections afforded by formal consultation that have been recognized by
the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th
Cir. 1985) (stating "[t]he ESA's procedural requirements call for a sys-
tematic determination of the effects of a federal project on endangered
species. If a project is allowed to proceed without substantial compli-
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been criticized as not providing enough protection for listed spe-
cies,11' several courts support the principle that an agency must
retain discretion to modify a proposed or ongoing action as a
prerequisite to requiring consultation.' 2
The situations in Sierra Club v. Babbitt and the Platte River cases
are similar to that which now exists in the case of the Hells Can-
yon Project, with one important exception: FERC has indicated
on several occasions that Article 35 contained in IPC's existing
FPA license reserves its authority to modify project operations to
conserve fish and wildlife." 3 FERC's interpretation of this license
article is reflected in several actions it has taken to require IPC
to provide for fish passage and hatchery supplementation."14
Such an interpretation is entitled to judicial deference." 5
ance with those procedural requirements, there can be no assurance
that a violation of the ESA's substantive provisions will not result. The
latter, of course, is impermissible").
11. See, e.g., David Paul Sharo, Regulatory Inertia: FERC's Failure to
Consider Endangered Species' Protection in the Issuance of Hydroelectric Annual
Licenses: Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v.
FERC, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 321 (1990).
112. See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995);
Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d at 1073; but c.f supra note 106 (in-
dicating that section 7(a) (1) may expand agencies' duties under the
ESA absent an express reservation of discretion for conservation
purposes).
113. FERC may also possess general discretion under its statutory
authorities to require project modifications in certain instances. For ex-
ample, FERC retains authority in all licenses to require project altera-
tions to protect health, safety, navigation, or property. See, e.g., 16
U.S.C. § 803(b)-(c) (1988). Further, many new licenses contain broad
provisions authorizing FERC oversight, to the point of reserving au-
thority to require project decommissioning in certain cases. See, e.g., 66
F.E.R.C. 61,316 (March 18, 1994) (license order for Reusens Hydro-
power Project). The presence of such broad reserved discretion should
enable FERC to modify project operations to ensure they do not jeop-
ardize listed species.
114. See supra note 29.
115. See Platte River II at 33.
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IV. THE EFFECT OF THE 1980 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ON
FERC's DUTY TO CONSULT
A. The Licensee's Interpretation of the Agreement
In 1980 IPC entered into a settlement agreement with NMFS
and state resource agencies; this agreement subsequently
adopted by FERC through a license order.116 IPC now claims the
1980 settlement agreement "effectively closed the license for the
remainder of its term," thereby eliminating FERC's discretion to
change project operations as well as the agency's need to consult
with NMFS under section 7 of the ESA." 7 However, this view is
flawed because it ignores the scope, purpose, and plain meaning
of the agreement.
B. The Present Day Meaning of the Agreement
1. The Agreement's Scope and Purpose
The scope and purpose of the 1980 agreement indicate that
neither IPC nor NMFS intended the agreement to foreclose ei-
ther parties' duties or responsibilities under the ESA. At the time
the agreement was signed, none of the species in question were
listed; therefore, there were no statutory requirements for parties
to avoid jeopardizing or taking the species under sections 7 or 9
of the ESA. In fact, the agreement nowhere mentions the ESA or
the potential duties of any of the parties, should species become
listed. Instead, the sole purpose of the 1980 agreement was to
settle IPC's duties to resource agencies under the FPA to miti-
gate project impacts on fishery resources." 8
116. See 10 EE.R.C. 61,190 (1980).
117. Letter from Robert W. Stahman, Vice President, IPC, to Lois
D. Cashell, Secretary, FERC, at 2 (June 26, 1997).
118. Article 35 of IPC's license permits the Secretary of Interior
and the conservation agencies of the States of Idaho and Oregon to
prescribe reasonable modifications to the project to conserve fishery re-
sources. See supra Section I.A. This duty was created by the FPA and
IPC's acceptance of the license conditions, and was the duty IPC
sought to eliminate in the 1980 agreement. See id.; see also 16 U.S.C. §
799 (1998) (conditioning licenses on acceptance of their terms). The
1980 agreement in no way limits or alters the parties' duties under the
ESA; rather, it only seeks to eliminate IPC's duty under the FPA.
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2. The Agreement's Plain Meaning
The plain language of the 1980 agreement supports the inter-
pretation that the statutory requirements of the ESA apply to
FERC and may require modification of project operations. In the
1980 settlement agreement, NMFS agreed not to seek relief from
FERC nor seek changes in project operations under Article 35 of
the license. 1 9 By its own terms, the agreement does not relieve
FERC from its statutory duty under the ESA to insure its own ac-
tions do not jeopardize listed species. Instead, the agreement at-
tempts only to limit NMFS' ability to pursue changes to project
operations under the FPA. The agreement does not foreclose
NMFS from recommending modifications to project operations
after FERC initiates consultation under section 7 or if compelled
to do so by a citizen suit.
3. The Agreement's Limitations
The 1980 settlement agreement stipulated that it would consti-
tute full and complete mitigation for all numerical losses of
salmon and steelhead under the existing license. 120 A hatchery
supplementation program was intended to mitigate for numeri-
cal losses; however, hatchery supplementation has in fact proven
a threat to chinook salmon and steelhead in the Snake River Ba-
sin.12' Consequently, while the agreement may compensate for
numerical losses of salmon, it does not address the quality of nat-
urally spawned salmonids, that is, those biological characteristics
necessary to sustain a distinct, naturally producing population
segment through time. 122 Therefore, even if the agreement fore-
119. See Idaho Power Company, supra note 35, § III.
120. See id.
121. See 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653, 14,660 (1992) (final rule listing Snake
River chinook salmon as threatened and identifying hatchery produc-
tion as a factor of decline for the species); 62 Fed. Reg. 43,937, 43,950
(1997) (final rule listing Snake River steelhead as threatened and iden-
tifying hatchery production as a factor of decline for the species).
122. The ESA mandates the restoration of threatened and endan-
gered species in their natural habitats to a level at which they can sus-
tain themselves naturally without further legal protection. See, e.g., 16
U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988) (purposes of the ESA); 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)
(1988) (provisions for recovery plans). For Pacific salmon, the ESA's fo-
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closed additional measures to increase population sizes, it does
not foreclose additional measures necessary to protect important
biological characteristics and functions that are essential to the
survival of listed salmonids.' 23
V. LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 9 AND THE DUTY TO AVOID
"TAKING" LISTED SPECIES
A. Defining Take under Section 9 of the ESA
Aside from the federal duty to consult and avoid jeopardy
under section 7, both federal and non-federal entities possess a
duty under section 9 to avoid taking listed species. 124 The ESA
defines "take" broadly under the ESA as "harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to
engage in such conduct." 125 NMFS regulations interpret the term
"harm" broadly to mean "an act which actually kills or injures
fish or wildlife. Such an act may include significant habitat modi-
fication or degradation which actually kills or injures fish or wild-
life by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, in-
cluding, breeding, spawning, rearing, migrating, feeding, and
sheltering."'126 The Supreme Court upheld this definition as a
permissible interpretation of the term, consistent with the overall
purposes of the ESA. 127
cus is, therefore, on natural populations (the progeny of naturally
spawning fish) and the ecosystems upon which they depend. See 58
Fed. Reg. 17,573 (1993) (NMFS' policy on artificial propagation).
123. Such biological characteristics would include the maintenance
of wild stocks and the protection of wild stocks from the impacts of
hatchery production. Consequently, it may be necessary to limit hatch-
ery production to protect listed species to avoid genetic introgression
and decreased fitness.
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1988).
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988).
126. 63 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1998) (proposed definition of the term
"harm").
127. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Comms. for a Great
Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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B. Provisions for Incidental Take Authorization
1. Incidental Take Authorization through Section 7
Sections 7 and 9 contain independent duties; therefore, prior
to the ESA's 1982 amendment, federal agencies would remain lia-
ble for taking even after complying with the terms of section 7.
In 1982 Congress amended the ESA to provide that as a result of
a section 7 consultation, federal agencies could obtain an inci-
dental take statement (ITS),'128 which permitted the action to
proceed without liability under section 9, so long as the amount
of incidental take contained in the ITS is not exceeded. 29 With-
out an ITS authorizing incidental take, parties must obtain a sec-
tion 10 permit 30 if their activity may take listed species. Absent
incidental take authorization, parties risk substantial liability, in-
128. See H.R. Rep. No. 567, at 6 (1982); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)
(1988).
129. If the amount of incidental take provided in the ITS is ex-
ceeded, agencies must reinitiate consultation. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16
(1998).
130. To obtain an incidental take permit pursuant to section 10,
parties must submit an acceptable conservation plan to NMFS for, its
review and approval. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1988). Such a conserva-
tion plan must specify (1) the impact which will result from the taking;
(2) the steps taken to minimize such taking; (3) alternative actions to
such taking considered and the reasons they are not used; and (4)
such measures as NMFS may require as being necessary or appropriate
for purposes of the plan. See 50 C.F.R. § 222.22(b) (1998) (listing per-
mit application procedures). NMFS and FWS have enacted policies pur-
suant to section 10 to encourage private landowners to formulate con-
servation plans (i.e., Habitat Conservation Plans) in exchange for long-
term assurances that no additional land use restrictions or financial
compensation will be required for their activities. See 62 Fed. Reg. 8859
(1998) (Joint FWS/NMFS "no surprises" policy). The "no surprises"
policy may encourage private parties (such as IPC) to pursue a section
10 permit instead of encouraging section 7 consultation because a sec-
tion 10 permit and the requirements contained in it will theoretically
remain unchanged for a long period of time. See Fred P. Bosselman,
The Statutory and Constitutional Mandate for a No Surprises Polic y, 24 EcoL-
oGY L. Q. 707 (1997). Conversely, federal parties must reinitiate consul-
tation if new information reveals effects to species not previously con-
sidered. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (1998). Therefore, section 7 consultation
does not possess the long-term certainty of a section 10 permit, making
consultation less desirable for parties financing long-term obligations.
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cluding injunctive relief and civil or criminal penalties, from citi-
zen suits for violating section 9.131
2. Private Party Duties Absent Section 7 Consultation
While the question of whether a FERC-licensee has an inde-
pendent duty to obtain a section 10 permit absent section 7 con-
sultation is yet unresolved, case law in the Ninth Circuit indicates
that such a duty exists. For example, in Forest Conservation Council
v. Rosboro Lumber Company, the BLM, in authorizing an access
road across federal lands, advised the defendant lumber com-
pany that its timber harvest on private lands may result in an in-
cidental take of listed spotted owls and recommended it seek an
incidental take permit from FWS. 32 While the Ninth Circuit
found that BLM's authorization of an access road did not consti-
tute an action requiring consultation under section 7(a)(2),
since BLM had not retained discretion to condition the private
actions, it nonetheless found that private logging activities made
possible by the federally-authorized right-of-way were subject to
the requirements of section 9.133 The Ninth Circuit went on to
hold that such private activities could be enjoined by private citi-
zens through the citizen suit provisions of the ESA. 134
Presently, the Hells Canyon Project, and many FERC-licensed
hydropower projects like it, do not possess incidental take au-
thorization under sections 7 and 10. As Rosboro demonstrates,
even if FERC need not consult over project operations due to its
lack of discretion to require changes, Ninth Circuit case law indi-
cates that FERC licensees remain independently liable under the
citizen suit provisions of the ESA if project operations are rea-
sonably certain to harm listed species. 35 Such potential liability
131. See, e.g., Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co.,
50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995); 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1988) (stating penalties
and enforcement provisions of the ESA).
132. Id. at 783.
133. See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1508-09 (9th Cir.
1995).
134. See Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50
F.3d at 785.
135. To prove that project operations constitute a taking of listed
salmonids, petitioners need to assert that project operations are actu-
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should motivate IPC and other FERC licensees to either en-
courage federal consultation to secure an ITS, or seek incidental
take authorization through section 10.136
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF REQUIRING ESA CONSULTATION FOR
FERC-LICENSED PROJECTS
A. Defining the Scope of the Problem
Based on the analysis above, coupled with FERC's own admis-
sions regarding the project's impacts on listed species, 37 the ESA
requires FERC to formally consult with NMFS over the ongoing
operations of the Hells Canyon Project. It is important to con-
sider why FERC, a federal agency entrusted with an obligation to
preserve listed species, would resist ESA consultation in a case
such as this. One reason may be that FERC is concerned with
the potential workload implications, particularly if it were held to
a stricter standard when ESA consultations are required for hy-
dropower projects under its jurisdiction.138 Another potential rea-
ally killing or injuring listed species or significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns. Such proof includes, breeding, spawning, rearing,
migrating, feeding, and sheltering. See supra Section V.A. Given the
documented effects of Hells Canyon project operations on listed
salmonids, petitioners could likely prove "actual harm" with relative
ease. See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653 (1992) (Snake River spring/summer
and fall chinook listed as threatened); 10 F.E.R.C. 61,190 (1980) (or-
der approving uncontested offer of settlement). Further, petitioners
may bring such an ESA takings claim directly against IPC in district
court under the citizen suit provisions of the ESA. See Forest Conserva-
tion Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d at 781. By bringing an
ESA takings claim directly against IPC, petitioners may avoid jurisdic-
tional problems associated with bringing claims directly against FERC.
See, e.g., Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. FERC, 967 F. Supp.
1166 (D. Ariz. 1997).
136. Advantages may exist for IPC to seek an incidental take per-
mit through section 10, given recent policy developments regarding
such permits. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
137. See supra Section I.B.
138. See supra note 113. As suggested in this note, a searching
court could conclude that FERC possesses discretion to modify project
operations for safety or monitoring purposes, even absent express res-
ervation in a license article. Such reserved discretion could provide the
basis for requiring FERC's consultation on conservation matters to the
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son for FERC's reluctance to initiate formal consultation may be
due to provisions in the ESA that limit the commitment of re-
sources once formal consultation commences.13 9
Currently, on the West Coast alone, 14 ESUs of Pacific salmon
and trout are listed under the ESA. 140 In addition to Hells Can-
yon, several hundred FERC-licensed hydropower projects also ex-
ist within this area and are likely to adversely affect or take these
species.14' These facts are staggering not only from biological and
legal standpoints, but also from a practical workload standpoint.
Section 7 consultations are typically resource-intensive exercises,
requiring substantial time commitments on behalf of the author-
izing agency and NMFS to complete. Consequently, if FERC were
required to initiate ESA consultations on every hydropower pro-
ject potentially affecting listed salmonids, both FERC and NMFS
would quickly become overwhelmed* by consultation
obligations. 142
While ESA consultation may seriously affect FERC's ability to
implement the FPA, FERC's reluctance in addressing its ESA ob-
ligations poses even greater threats to at-risk species. For exam-
ple, under FERC's current interpretation of the FPA, when hy-
dropower project licenses expire, projects are free to continue
extent project operations affect listed species.
139. See supra note 69. As discussed in this note, section 7(d) of
the ESA limits irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources by
federal action once formal consultation commences. Consequently, if
FERC commenced consultation on project operations, it must insure
section 7(d) was not violated. This could entail restricting project oper-
ations during the interim period until formal consultations were com-
plete and an ITS issued.
140. See supra note 7.
141. See supra note 27.
142. Practical considerations such as these, however, should not
weigh heavily in a court's analysis of FERC's duties under the ESA.
When faced with such practical constraints, federal agencies may for-
mulate plans to carry out their statutory duties in an orderly fashion.
For example, where federal agencies face an enormous backlog of re-
quests under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1998),
courts have recognized the impossibility of ordering agencies to comply
in a particular time and have accepted reasonable agency plans for ac-
tion. See, e.g., Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547
F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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operating under the original license terms until relicensing is
completed. 143 Absent some intervening factor, projects may there-
fore continue to operate for decades even after their licenses ex-
pire under requirements that are outdated and no longer suited
to existing environmental conditions.144
B. Addressing the Need for Consultation: A Comprehensive Approach
Given the practical and legal problems facing the federal gov-
ernment and its licensees, coupled with the declining status of
listed species, it is important that the federal government con-
sider a programmatic approach to FERC relicensing and ESA
consultation which can more effectively address the agencies'
practical limitations and statutory duties. Such an approach
would entail FERC, NMFS, and FWS entering into an agreement
to devise a comprehensive plan for consulting on hydropower
projects that affect listed salmonids and other species. To address
the goals of the ESA and FPA, such a plan should take into ac-
count a variety of factors, including: (1) the magnitude of pro-
ject impacts on listed species; (2) the status of the particular spe-
cies affected and the need for immediate modifications to
project operations to protect that species; (3) the status of the
project license and when relicensing will occur; and (4) the will-
ingness of licensees to take voluntary measures prior to relicens-
ing to limit project impacts on listed species. Ultimately, such a
plan would necessarily establish time frames for completing pri-
oritized consultations, while avoiding lengthy delays often associ-
ated with the relicensing process.
143. See Platte River II at 32.
144. See, e.g., PACIFIC STATES MARINE FISHERIES COMMISSION, HABITAT
HOTLINE, No. 38, Cushman License 6-7 (1998). This article states that in
the case of the Cushman Hydropower Project, located on the North
Fork Skokomish River in Washington, the licensee (Tacoma Power) op-
erated this project on annual licenses for over 24 years while relicens-
ing proceedings occurred. During this period, salmon runs in the Sko-
komish River basin were reduced to critically low numbers. Project
operations contributed to this decline because the project eliminated
about 84 percent of the North Fork Skokomish watershed from salmon
production.
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Several benefits would follow from this approach. First, it
would establish an orderly consultation schedule that would en-
able the agencies to better manage their current and future wor-
kloads, allowing for a more efficient use of available resources.
Second, licensees would receive more certainty regarding when
project operations may change as a result of ESA obligations.
This would provide licensees with an opportunity to plan for
their future needs and financial liabilities. Third, a comprehen-
sive approach such as this should receive judicial deference in
the event that third party lawsuits are brought to compel ESA
consultation, since the agencies are making reasonable attempts
to comply with the law.1 45 Finally, by agreeing to a prioritized
schedule such as this, it would be possible to avoid years of delay
associated with the relicensing process; such delays may result in
species extinction.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have interpreted
the requirement for section 7 consultation broadly, noting that
the procedural requirements of section 7 ensure that federal
agencies achieve the ESA's substantive goals. 46 If a federal action
proceeds without substantial compliance with these procedural
requirements, there can be no assurance of ESA compliance.147
When evaluating agency actions requiring consultation, the
courts have deferred to NMFS' implementing regulations which
state that an agency must consult over a proposed or ongoing ac-
tion if it has retained discretionary involvement or authority to
act. 148 In the case of the Hells Canyon Project, FERC itself has
demonstrated that it retains discretion to modify project opera-
tions under Article 35 of the project's license, 149 a key factor in a
court's analysis of FERC's duty to consult under the ESA. °50 Yet,
145. See, e.g., Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force,
547 F.2d at 615-616.
146. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 186 (1978); Pac. Riv-
ers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1994).
147. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985).
148. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987).
149. See supra Section I.A.
150. See Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995);
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despite two separate NMFS requests for FERC to initiate formal
consultations on the operation of the Hells Canyon Project,
FERC has not done so. 151 These requests by NMFS should be af-
forded substantial deference by the courts because they are
NMFS' interpretation of the ESA and it's implementing regula-
tions.1 52 A 1980 settlement agreement between IPC and the re-
source agencies, adopted by FERC order, does not limit FERC's
discretion to modify project operations, nor does it limit FERC's
statutory duty to avoid jeopardizing listed species through consul-
tation with NMFS.153 The scope and purpose of this agreement
are quite narrow, and the agreement does not attempt to affect
the parties' obligations under the ESA.15 4 As a result, absent for-
mal consultation, IPC must obtain an incidental take permit
from NMFS to avoid liability for taking listed chinook or
steelhead 55
FERC's need to initiate formal consultation for the Hells Can-
yon Project raises the thorny issue of its need to consult over the
ongoing operations of every hydropower project in the United
States that is affecting listed species, irrespective of its licensing
status. Such a precedent could prove onerous to FERC from a
practical standpoint, but this burden does not permit FERC to
escape its duty under the ESA to ensure that its actions do not
jeopardize listed species. A programmatic approach to FERC's
consultations would provide it and its licensees with greater pre-
dictability regarding their ESA obligations. Such an approach
would also result in quicker action on the part of FERC in modi-
fying project operations that are devastating listed salmonids and
threatening their continued existence. Finally, FERC's use of its
authorities to conserve listed species in this manner is more con-
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125
(9th Cir. 1998); Platte River II at 32.
151. See supra Section I.B.
152. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d at 1388; Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Comms. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703 (1995);
The Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, 11 F. Supp. 2d 529, 546 (D. Va.
1998).
153. See supra Section VI.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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sistent with its duties under section 7(a) (1) to consult and de-
velop programs for the conservation of each endangered and
threatened species. 5 6
156. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.

